报告题目： Partial Centralization in Competing Supply Chains

报 告 人 :   施春明教授（加拿大劳瑞尔大学终身教授）

报告时间： 2019年4月25日下午3:00-4:30

报告地点：经管院B203

主办单位：西南大学经济管理学院

报告人简介： 施春明，就职于加拿大劳瑞尔大学拉扎里迪斯商业与经济学院（Wilfrid Laurier University-Lazaridis School of Business and Economics），终身教授，博士生导师。本科毕业于中国科技大学，并获得商业管理与电气管理双学位，此后，又先后获得了新加坡国立大学硕士学位，以及美国华盛顿州立大学运营管理博士学位。 施春明教授的研究广泛、教学兴趣多样化，其中包括供应链管理、可持续性发展，运作管理和会计的交叉研究。他的研究成果已发表在多家杂志上，如欧洲运筹学杂志，运筹学学会杂志，国际生产经济学杂志，和Omega等。 施春明教授的研究得到了加拿大国家科学、工程研究理事会以及加拿大特许会计师协会的支持，并在多年的教学实践中积累了丰富的教学经验，指导了多位博士后, 博士和硕士研究生。

报告简介： A great amount of research has been done on whether a supply chain should be complete centralized or complete decentralized. With a completely centralized supply chain, a manufacturer can sell directly to the consumers or fully own the downstream retailer. With a completely decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer and the downstream retailer make decisions to optimize their own interests. However, complete centralization or complete decentralization may be inconsistent with the common business practice of partial centralization (PC) among firms. That is, a firm may own only a part of another firm within the same supply chain. In this paper, we make an important contribution by studying PC in two competing supply chains each with a manufacturer and a retailer. Our analyses and results show that for the competing manufacturers and their supply chains, PC can always lead to higher profits than complete centralization regardless of the level of product substitutability. Furthermore, PC can lead to higher profits for the manufacturers and their supply chains than complete decentralization except when competing are close to perfect substitutes. Therefore, this research offers an important explanation of the widespread business phenomenon of partial centralization in supply chains.